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Employment Law Considerations
for Law Schools Hiring
Legal Writing Professors
Ann C. McGinley
I. Introduction
About thirty years ago, law schools began to hire professional lawyers to
teach clinical and legal writing courses to their students. Before this change,
few or no clinics existed, and legal writing was often taught by third-year
students or by individual tenured faculty members, who spent little time on
their legal writing teaching. Hiring young lawyers to teach and paying them a
low rate was a cost-eﬀective way of improving the instruction in legal research,
writing, and analysis. Law schools hired as instructors or visitors legal writing
faculty members, who had few rights. Often, legal writing faculty members
had one- or two-year renewable contracts; other schools had a cap of two or
three years, after which legal writing instructors had to leave the institution. In
both cases, the position oﬀered low pay and minimal job security.1
The change to full-time legal writing faculty members occurred at the
same time that women began attending and graduating from law schools in
record numbers. And, while many of these women found jobs in the large
and small law ﬁrms upon graduation, as they began to have families, some
sought alternatives to law ﬁrm associate positions. Even though legal writing
teaching did not oﬀer the prestige or pay that tenure-track teaching or law ﬁrm
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1.

See Jan M. Levine, Voices in the Wilderness: Tenured and Tenure-Track Directors and Teachers in Legal
Research and Writing Programs, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 530, 530–31 (1995) (“Historically, most law
schools devoted inadequate resources to LRW programs and assigned research and writing
teachers to low-status positions. Tenure-track appointments were virtually unheard of; and
most full-time writing teachers, a rare group, had short-term appointments—by virtue of
program design, resource allocation, and organizational or administrative structure.”); Jo
Anne Durako, Dismantling Hierarchies: Occupational Segregation of Legal Writing Faculty in Law Schools:
Separate and Unequal, 73 UMKC L. REV. 253, 265–68 (2004) (discussing “separate and unequal
pay scales” and “lack of job security” for legal writing faculty); Jan M. Levine & Kathryn
M. Stanchi, Women, Writing & Wages: Breaking the Last Taboo, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 551,
553–65 (2001) (discussing ﬁndings of historical surveys of legal writing programs and faculty
and the continued prevalence of the “contract-track staﬃng model”).
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associate positions did, some excellent female lawyers chose to take positions
as legal writing faculty in law schools because these jobs apparently aﬀorded
the women more ﬂexibility: Legal writing instructors did not ordinarily teach
in the summer, and they were not expected to engage in scholarly publication
or to serve on committees in law schools. There was (and still is), however,
intense work preparing legal writing problems for their students, grading
papers, and meeting with students in conferences to go over their work.2
A three-tier hierarchy ensued. At the top were the tenured and tenure-track
faculty members. Next came the clinical faculty members, and, ﬁnally, the
legal writing instructors.3 Then, as now, the vast majority of legal writing
teachers were women.4
The American Bar Association adopted Standard 405(c) to grant
employment security to law school clinical faculty members who are not
employed on the tenure track. It adopted Standard 405(d) speciﬁcally to
govern the status of legal writing faculty members. Standard 405(d), however,
grants lesser rights than those provided to clinical faculty members by 405(c).
Standard 405(c) is preferable to 405(d) status because it at least provides
security of position “reasonably similar to tenure”; 405(d) status accords only
that security of position that is necessary to “attract and retain” a well-qualiﬁed
2.

For a discussion of the historical trends, including the “inﬂux of women into law schools in
the mid-1970s,” the “reasons that law schools hired many more women than men as a legal
research and writing instructors,” and how “[t]eaching legal writing is one of the most laborintensive jobs in the law school,” see Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M. Levine, Gender and Legal
Writing: Law Schools’ Dirty Little Secrets, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 6–9 (2001). See also Linda
L. Berger, Linda H. Edwards & Terrill Pollman, The Past, Presence, and Future of Legal Writing
Scholarship: Rhetoric, Voice, and Community, 16 LEGAL WRITING 521, 542 n.64 (2010) (“Teaching
writing is extraordinarily labor intensive. Marking papers, conferencing with students, and
creating new assignments year after year takes time. Finding time to write during the school
year is diﬃcult, if not impossible. Summers are often devoted to developing assignments
or to summer teaching to supplement salaries that as a rule are lower than the rest of the
permanent faculty’s.”).

3.

BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 32 (2012) (“It’s true, and lamentable, that clinical
teachers have second-class status within many law schools. For that matter, professors who
teach legal writing—an essential lawyer skill—have even lower status, third class . . . .”);
Durako, supra note 1, at 267 (“Writing faculty are the only class of full-time faculty who are
not provided with job security and whose employment term may be limited to a maximum
number of years . . . . Writing faculty are not guaranteed tenure under the ABA Standards,
nor are they granted even the so-called ‘clinical tenure’ that Standard 405(c) accords other
skills faculty.”)

4.

See ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL WRITING INST., REPORT OF THE ANNUAL LEGAL
WRITING SURVEY vi (2014), http://www.alwd.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/2014-SurveyReport-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8V3-Q5GK] [hereinafter ALWD/LWI 2014 REPORT]
(“For the schools that reported on gender diversity for all current full-time legal writing
faculty, 72% of legal writing faculty were female and 28% were male (relatively constant from
73% female and 27% male in 2013).”); Kristen K. Tiscione & Amy Vorenberg, Podia and Pens:
Dismantling the Two-Track System for Legal Research and Writing Faculty, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 47,
48–49 (2015) (“The over-representation of women in skills teaching positions, particularly
legal research and writing, and their under-representation in podium, tenure-track positions
are well-documented.”)
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faculty and to “safeguard academic freedom.” In contrast, Standard 405(d)
makes no comparison to the security of position aﬀorded by tenure. Standards
405(c) and (d) state:
(c) A law school shall aﬀord to full-time clinical faculty members a form
of security of position reasonably similar to tenure, and non-compensatory
perquisites reasonably similar to those provided other full-time faculty
members. A law school may require these faculty members to meet standards
and obligations reasonably similar to those required of other full-time faculty
members. However, this Standard does not preclude a limited number of
ﬁxed, short-term appointments in a clinical program predominantly staﬀed by
full-time faculty members, or in an experimental program of limited duration.
(d) A law school shall aﬀord legal writing teachers such security of position
and other rights and privileges of faculty membership as may be necessary to
(1) attract and retain a faculty that is well qualiﬁed to provide legal writing
instruction as required by Standard 303(a)(2), and (2) safeguard academic
freedom. 5

Recently, a number of law schools have applied 405(c) standards to their legal
writing faculty as a means of creating greater equality for them. Nonetheless,
many argue that even Standard 405(c) grants insuﬃcient protection to both
legal writing and clinical faculty members. Professor Melissa Weresh’s essay
examines the eﬀect of using 405(c) status.6 In this essay, I respond to Professor
Weresh’s arguments by commenting on the employment law implications of
applying 405(c) status to legal writing faculty. I do not address 405(c) status
as it applies to clinical faculty. Neither do I comment on 405(d) status as it
applies to legal writing faculty, other than to say that it clearly creates even
greater inequality between tenure-track and 405(d)-status faculty than 405(c)
does.
Standard 405(c) encourages the creation of long-term contracts.
Interpretation 405-6 deﬁnes “long-term contracts” as a series of at least ﬁveyear contracts that are “presumptively renewable.”7
Legal writing teaching has become a discipline in itself over the years, with a
number of key organizations sponsoring conferences to improve legal writing
5.

SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, 2015-2016 § 405(c), at 29 (2015)
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].

6.

See Melissa Weresh, Best Practices for Protecting Security of Position for 405(c) Faculty, 66 J. LEGAL.
EDUC. 538 (2017).

7.

Interpretation 405–6 states in part:
For the purposes of this Interpretation, “long-term contract” means at least a ﬁveyear contract that is presumptively renewable or other arrangement suﬃcient to
ensure academic freedom. During the initial long-term contract or any renewal period,
the contract may be terminated for good cause, including termination or material
modiﬁcation of the entire clinical program.
Interpretation 405–6, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 29–30.
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pedagogy and scholarship. 8 Along with these changes have come criticism that
law schools do not grant suﬃcient employment beneﬁts to their legal writing
instructors. In response, law schools have created a variety of arrangements
for legal writing professionals. Increasingly, some schools hire legal writing
faculty by engaging in national searches, appoint legal writing faculty to the
tenure track,9 and expect that legal writing faculty members fulﬁll similar or
the same criteria for tenure as required of doctrinal faculty members. Other
law schools have created specialized tenure tracks for legal writing faculty
members that have diﬀerent requirements for tenure than those for doctrinal
faculty, normally with a focus on teaching and a diﬀerent or no publication
requirement. Still others have created mechanisms for appointing their legal
writing faculty to 405(c) contract status. Finally, a number of schools continue
to employ legal writing teachers on short-term contracts.10
Interpretation 405-6 makes clear that the term of the long-term contract
should be at least ﬁve years, that job security be “reasonably similar to
tenure,” and that once a faculty member has a 405(c) contract, the contract
is “presumptively renewable.” 11 It does not, however, deﬁne either of these
two terms. For tenure-track faculty members, each law school creates its own
substantive and procedural rules for determining whether a faculty member
has earned tenure. Likewise, in the case of a 405(c) contract, law schools should
create their own substantive and procedural rules for earning such a contract.
Law schools should also write procedural rules for “presumptive renewal” of
faculty members with 405(c) status.
II. Best Practices under ABA Standard 405(c)
Professor Melissa Weresh’s account of “best practices” urges that once a
faculty member has a long-term contract under 405(c), she or he should have
the same or similar contractual rights regarding security of position as the
AAUP guidelines grant to tenured faculty members. Presumably, law schools
would create clear substantive rules and procedures for a probationary period
for law faculty members hired into jobs leading to long-term contracts that is
similar to that of tenure-track faculty members and a rigorous process after
that probationary period (similar to that for granting tenure) for determining
8.

One example is the Legal Writing Institute, whose website announces conferences, awards,
and accomplishments. See LEGAL WRITING INST., http://www.lwionline.org; another is the
Association of Legal Writing Directors (ALWD), which oﬀers information on its website
that pertains to teaching legal writing, see ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS., http://www.alwd.
org.

9.

According to the most recent ALWD/LWI survey of legal writing directors, about ten
percent of programs employed only tenured or tenure-track individuals to teach legal
writing in 2014. About thirty-four percent of programs employed a hybrid approach, and
the majority of them used a mixture of tenured and tenure-track individuals and contractstatus individuals to teach legal writing. See ALWD/LWI 2014 REPORT supra note 4, at v.

10.

See generally ALWD/LWI 2014 REPORT, supra note 4.

11.

Interpretation 405–6, supra note 7.
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whether the faculty member has earned 405(c) status and its concomitant
beneﬁts. Once earned, that status, according to “best practices,” would accord
the same or “reasonably similar” job security rights to legal writing faculty
members with a 405(c) contract that a faculty member would have with tenure.
To the extent the particular institution has adopted the AAUP guidelines in
law school policies that reference university or system policies, a contractual
right to job retention may exist unless the university carries the burden of
proving that it has declared ﬁnancial exigency, has eliminated the legal writing
program, or that the law school has cause to terminate or not renew the
individual legal writing professor’s contract—for incompetence or misconduct.
If the law school has post-tenure review for tenured faculty members, a
similar review would also apply to faculty members with 405(c) contract status.
If exigency or elimination of a program for cause is shown, the legal writing
faculty member on a 405(c) contract, just like a tenured faculty member, would
be dismissible upon the proper proof in accordance with the AAUP guidelines
and the bylaws of the law school and university even before the expiration of
the ﬁve-year contract.
While full tenure-track status on a unitary track or specialized tenure of legal
writing faculty is the preferable means to recognize excellent teaching and to
encourage valuable scholarship,12 some law schools have opted to give 405(c)
status to their legal writing faculty; therefore, it is important to consider the
employment situation of those faculty members with 405(c) status. Moreover,
given the time-intensive teaching of some legal writing jobs, some schools may
wish that their legal writing faculty members focus on teaching and service and
not engage in scholarship. While specialized tenure might serve this purpose,
some universities do not permit specialized tenure. An alternative, if the job
of the legal writing professor is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that of the tenure-track
or tenured faculty member and the standards for achieving job security are
diﬀerent, 405(c) status may be an attractive option. It gives law schools the
ﬂexibility to tailor the requirements of earning the long-term contract to the
job envisioned.
III. Discrimination Issues in Legal Writing Programs
A sticky problem for law schools that decide to use 405(c) contracts instead
of tenure-track appointments for legal writing teachers is the predominance
of female faculty members who teach writing. Legal writing teaching has
long been considered a “pink ghetto” in law schools, because legal writing
faculty members are mostly women who have less status, worse employment
conditions, and lower salaries than tenure-track and tenured faculty.13 The
12.

See generally Kathryn Stanchi, The Problem with ABA 405(c), 66 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 558 (2017); Linda
Berger, Rhetoric and Reality in the ABA Standards, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 553 (2017); Mary Beth
Beazley, Finishing the Job of Legal Education Reform, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 275 (2016).

13.

See Ann C. McGinley, Discrimination in Our Midst: Law Schools’ Potential Liability for Employment
Practices, 14 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 6–10 (2005); Kristen Konrad Tiscione, “Best Practices” A
Giant Step Toward Ensuring Compliance with ABA Standard 405(c), A Small Yet Important Step Toward
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most recent survey of the Association of Legal Writing Directors/Legal
Writing Institute (ALWD/LWI) from 2014 demonstrates that 72% of full-time
legal writing teachers were women and 28% were men. The vast majority of
legal writing teachers were Caucasian (87.9%).14 These demographic data raise
serious questions for schools that seek to use 405(c) status for legal writing
faculty.
IV. Potential Legal Liability for Employment Practices and
Long-term Contracts under 405(c)
Law schools have potential legal liability for gender-based employment
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196415 and Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 197216 where legal writing faculty members
in the law school are predominantly female. If the 405(c) program creates
contractual rights that are lesser than the rights created by tenure, a group
of female plaintiﬀs could bring a class action alleging that the employer
intentionally engaged in systemic disparate treatment, discriminating against
them by granting them diﬀerential and inferior employment rights because of
their gender. In the alternative, an individual plaintiﬀ or a class of plaintiﬀs
could bring a Title VII or Title IX claim alleging that the law school’s policies
and practices have a disparate impact on women. In either case, law schools
may be liable for illegal discriminatory employment practices.
A. Systemic Disparate Treatment under Title VII
The systemic-disparate-treatment cause of action would allege that the
employer engaged in a pattern and practice of sex discrimination, and that
sex discrimination was the “standard operating procedure” of the law school.17
If the plaintiﬀs prove that women were hired into these positions because of
their sex, and that men who were no more qualiﬁed than the women were
hired into full tenure-track positions, the women could potentially prevail. To
prove a systemic-disparate-treatment case, the plaintiﬀs would use statistics
about the pool of qualiﬁed individuals for the jobs of legal writing and tenuretrack jobs and compare the proportions of women and men who are hired
Addressing Gender Discrimination in the Legal Academy, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 566 (2017); Beazley, supra
note 12, at 289–95; Stanchi & Levine, supra note 2; Jo Anne Durako, Second-Class Citizens in the
Pink Ghetto: Gender Bias in Legal Writing, 50 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 562 (2000).
For an insightful explanation of the unique diﬃculties suﬀered by women of color who
teach legal writing, see Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, On Writing Wrongs: Legal Writing Professors of
Color and the Curious Case of 405(c), 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 575 (2017).
14.

See ALWD/LWI 2014 REPORT, supra note 4, at vi.

15.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).

16.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012).

17.

See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (holding that the
plaintiﬀs could use statistics to prove that racial discrimination was the “standard operating
procedure” of the defendant).
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for those jobs.18 Additionally, the plaintiﬀs would oﬀer anecdotal evidence
that indicates that the law school harbored stereotypes about women’s
qualiﬁcations for the job of legal writing professor or other comments that
indicate that the employer considered gender in making its employment
and/or status decisions.19 Comments about expectations that students need
women (or particular women) in the legal writing jobs because women do
well giving students individual attention, etc., could potentially demonstrate
stereotyping. Under Title VII, discrimination based on gender stereotyping is
discrimination based on sex.20 Moreover, evidence of diﬀerential treatment of
male and female legal writing faculty members would be important anecdotal
evidence in a systemic-disparate-treatment case. Research demonstrates that
employers tend to promote men in predominantly female-occupied jobs more
rapidly than women.21
Employers would have a potential defense under EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co.22 if they can demonstrate that the 405(c) jobs are diﬀerent from the tenuretrack jobs and that women took the 405(c) jobs out of choice, rather than
discrimination. The choice defense, however, has come under attack by legal
academics,23 and would likely be problematic in many schools that have policies
that prevent faculty members in 405(c) contract positions from being hired
onto the tenure track from those positions. In other words, the presence of a
policy that forbids hiring into a tenure-track position from a 405(c) position,
especially if the individual legal writing faculty members are not notiﬁed about
that policy before working at the law school, tend to belie choice of the women
in the 405(c) jobs. Moreover, this policy of preventing faculty members with
18.

Id. For more discussion of the systemic-disparate-treatment cause of action, see McGinley,
supra, note 13, at 575-80.

19.

See McGinley, supra, note 13, at 575-80 (explaining how female legal writing faculty could
prove sex discrimination against their employer law schools).

20.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).

21.

See, e.g., David J. Maume, Jr., Glass Ceilings and Glass Elevators: Occupational Segregation and Race
and Sex Diﬀerences in Managerial Promotions, 26 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 483 (1999) (ﬁnding in
empirical study that white men occupying jobs traditionally held by women are promoted
more rapidly than white women, black women, and black men). Of course, to the extent that
legal writing faculty who are of color are promoted less readily than their white counterparts
or are judged more harshly, this would be evidence of racial discrimination as well. See also
McMurtry-Chubb, supra note 13 at 580–82 (detailing how the structure of many legal writing
programs with white women as directors and better status supervising white women and
women of color leads to inequitable results in particular for women of color).

22.

839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (aﬃrming judgment in favor of employer in sex discrimination
case because plaintiﬀ had failed to present suﬃcient evidence rebutting employer’s evidence
that women occupied the lower-paid positions because they were not interested in more
highly paid jobs).

23.

See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Essay, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1894–98 (2000) (arguing
that women do not choose to be channeled into lower-paying lesser jobs); Vicki Schultz,
Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title
VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (discussing how employers
channel women into less desirable jobs).
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405(c) jobs from hiring onto the tenure track may create a disparate impact on
female faculty members, as I explain in the next subsection.
B. Disparate Impact Theory under Title VII
Any policy or practice that has a disparate impact on women and that the law
school cannot prove is “consistent with business necessity” and “job related”
is vulnerable to legal challenge under Title VII.24 A challenge that a neutral
policy creates a disparate impact on a protected group does not require the
plaintiﬀs to prove that the employer intentionally discriminated against the
group because of its protected status. Rather, in this situation women would
demonstrate that the policies have a disparate eﬀect on women. Such proof
would shift the burden of persuasion to the law school to demonstrate that
the policy is “consistent with business necessity” and “job related.” Policies
or practices that prohibit movement from 405(c) contract status to tenuretrack status can be attacked as creating an illegal disparate impact on women
because of the statistics demonstrating that women predominate in these
contract statuses. Once these statistics are oﬀered into evidence, the women
will have proved that the neutral policy has a disparate eﬀect on women. At
that point the employer has the burden of proving that the policy is job-related
and consistent with business necessity. It may be diﬃcult for law schools to
defend the policy. When asked about the reasons for this policy, most law
schools with the policy argue that it is too diﬃcult for the faculty not to hire a
well-regarded, well-performing faculty member on a 405(c) contract onto the
tenure track. In other words, faculties will be pressured by their relationship
with their colleague to hire her. This does not seem to meet the job-related and
consistent with business necessity standard. Of course, this does not mean that
each faculty member with a 405(c) contract should be hired onto the tenure
track. It merely means that the policy not permitting faculty members to
judge the individual accomplishments and qualiﬁcations of the 405(c) faculty
members who apply for tenure-track jobs is suspect.
Other policies that limit the rights of legal writing faculty, such as diﬀerential
pay or beneﬁts or less support for travel or scholarly pursuit, may also create
legal liability if the employer cannot prove that these policies are related to the
speciﬁc job of the legal writing professor and consistent with business necessity
of the law school. If, however, the employer can demonstrate that the jobs of
legal writing professor and tenure-track or tenured professor who teaches and
24.

In pertinent part, the disparate impact provision in Title VII states:
(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases.
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under
this subchapter only if—
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity
....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
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does research in a substantive area are diﬀerent, the court may ﬁnd that the
policies are job-related and consistent with business necessity. The employer
would need to articulate why it needs diﬀerential standards and treatment
of legal writing teachers, given the predominance of women teaching legal
writing and the predominance of men teaching doctrinal courses in many
schools.
The bottom line is the following: Where the standards for achieving the
long-term contract status and the job of legal writing are well-aligned and
suﬃciently diﬀerent from those for achieving tenure and the job of a tenured
professor, a 405(c) contract is a viable option for the law school. If, however,
the standards (teaching, scholarship, and service) are the same or very similar,
the legal writing faculty should be on a tenure track if the law school is to
avoid liability based on disparate treatment or disparate impact under Title
VII.25
Under the “substantially similar” language of 405(c) combined with AAUP
guidelines incorporated by reference, a person who has achieved a long-term
contract as a result of a rigorous procedural and substantive process (similar
to that of tenured faculty) should have job security that is nearly the same as
or substantially similar to that of tenured faculty members. Since there is a
presumption of renewal, the legal writing faculty member should be renewed
if the employer cannot demonstrate that there is cause not to renew, deﬁned
as misconduct or incompetence. And, for the job security to be “substantially
similar” to tenure, the employee with a 405(c) contract should have procedural
rights that are either the same as or similar to those of the tenured faculty
members, which diﬀer depending on the university. Job security protects
academic freedom of faculty members to teach and publish in a manner
consistent with their educational goals.
C. Title IX Liability
Title IX of the Education Amendments prohibits discrimination because
of sex in employment practices by educational institutions receiving federal
ﬁnancial assistance. 26 Under Title IX, it is illegal to segregate or classify
employees based on sex and to use neutral practices that create a disparate
impact on persons because of sex, unless those policies are, as in Title VII, jobrelated and consistent with business necessity. Title IX regulations make clear
that Title IX applies to job classiﬁcations and to hiring and tenure decisions,
etc.27 For example, 34 C.F.R. § 106.55 states:

25.

A law professor who taught doctrinal courses for thirty years and then taught legal writing
for a semester disputes that the job is diﬀerent, at least in his institution. See John A. Lynch,
Jr., Teaching Legal Writing After a Thirty-Year Respite: No Country for Old Men?, 38 CAPITAL U. L. REV.
1 (2009).

26.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012).

27.

34 C.F.R. §§ 106.51, 106.55 (2016).
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A recipient shall not: . . .
(b) Maintain or establish separate lines of progression, seniority lists,
career ladders, or tenure systems based on sex; or
(c) Maintain or establish separate lines of progression, seniority systems,
career ladders, or tenure systems for similar jobs, position descriptions, or job
requirements which classify persons on the basis of sex, unless sex is a bonaﬁde occupational qualiﬁcation for the positions in question as set forth in §
106.61.

While (c) appears to refer to classiﬁcations explicitly based on sex, there is
a good argument that the classiﬁcations used by law schools in legal writing
programs are based on sex because neutral hiring and promotion policies have
a disparate impact on female faculty members. The language of the regulation
refers to “similar jobs.” As with Title VII, a law school whose legal writing
faculty members perform “similar jobs” may be liable under Title IX for sex
discrimination.
Persons aggrieved by Title IX can bring a private cause of action or can ﬁle
a complaint with the Department of Education, Oﬃce of Civil Rights, which
will conduct an investigation into the complaint.
Courts interpreting Title IX often resort to Title VII for guidance, and have
applied disparate treatment and disparate impact theories discussed above in
the Title IX context. Thus, it is likely that an educational employer would
not escape Title IX liability and/or an investigation by the Department of
Education’s Oﬃce of Civil Rights.
V. Conclusion
Law schools have for decades struggled with unequal employment conditions
for their clinical and legal writing faculty. While Standard 405(c) was an attempt
to create more equal conditions for clinical faculty members, and a number of
schools have applied 405(c) to their contracts with legal writing faculty, 405(c)
contracts are not a magic bullet. In the legal writing context, these contracts
may expose schools to legal liability for sex discrimination, especially if the
jobs performed by legal writing faculty members are substantially similar
to those performed by tenured and tenure-track faculty members. Standard
405(c) contracts are preferable to short-term contracts because they, combined
with AAUP guidelines incorporated by reference into employment contracts,
oﬀer signiﬁcantly more job security than in the past. Nonetheless, as others
have argued, a preferable system to assure that legal writing faculty teach and
publish up to their potential is for law schools to hire legal writing faculty onto
the tenure track or, in the very least, to create a form of specialized tenure that
is tailored to the performance expectations of legal writing faculty.

